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points in relationship to the number of
instructions in the program." Apple,
714 F.2d at 1245. Franklin defended,
however, that the operating programs
were not copyrightable; first, because
they are embedded on a micro~chip and
are therefore a form of machinery and
second, because they cannot be distin~
guished from the concept of operating
the computer system, they are more
than the mere expression of an idea.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 102
(1976).
Both of Franklin's arguments were
rejected by the court which reasoned
that the programs do not meet the
requirements of the Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. The
programs are "literary works," and they
are "fixed in [a] tangible medium of
expression." Id. at § 102(a). The court
went on to hold that "the medium is not
the message" and the fact that a program
is recorded on a device which is part of
the machinery is a mere change in the
tangible form. Apple, 714 F .2d at 1251.
In response to Franklin's second argu~
ment that an operating system is a mere
method of operation and not protected,
the court relied on Congress's Commis~
sion on New Technological Uses report
which stated "[t]hat the words of a
program are used ultimately in the
implementation of a process should in
no way affect their copyrightability." id.
The court also found that Apple was
seeking only to copyright the instructions
and not the computer operating method.
With the growing number of personal
computers in businesses and private
homes throughout the United States,
this decision protects not only large
computer companies such as Apple, but
also the individual computer operator
who creates hislher own operating
program. ~

by Sylvia Halkousis

LACK OF JURY
IMPARTIALITY REQUIRED
FOR NEW TRIAL

I

n McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.
v. Greenwood, _ U.S. _ (1984),

the United States Supreme Court
clarified the bases upon which a motion
for new trial made as a result of a juror's
failure to disclose information on voir
dire will be granted. To prevail upon
such a motion, a party must show that a
juror's answer to a material question on
voir dire was dishonest and that had the
juror answered honestly, grounds estab~
lishing a challenge for cause would have
been present.
In McDonough Power, Billy Greenwood
and his parents brought suit against
McDonough Power Equipment Incor~
porated to recover damages for injuries
sustained by Billy when his feet came in
contact with the blades of a riding lawn
mower manufactured by McDonough,
Inc. During voir dire, prospective jurors
were asked if they or any of their family
members had ever sustained a severe
injury. One individual, who eventually
became a member of the jury, failed to
respond to this question. After the trial,
the United States District Court entered
judgment upon a jury verdict for
McDonough, Inc.
After entry of the judgment, the
Greenwoods requested and received
permission to approach the jurors in an
attempt to elicit information regarding
injuries sustained by them or members
of their families. Despite discovery of
evidence that a juror had not disclosed
information regarding such injuries, the
district court denied the Greenwood's
motion for a new trial, stating that the
jury verdict was fair and well~supported.
The Greenwoods appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
which reversed the district court judg~
ment. In Greenwood v. McDonough Power
Equipment, Inc., 687 F.2d338 (10th Cir.
1982), the court of appeals held that the
Greenwood's right of per~emptory
challenge had been prejudiced because
of the juror's failure to respond to a
question on voir dire. To cure the error
of the juror's "probable bias," a new
trial was granted. The Supreme Court
however, reversed, holding that a new
trial will not be granted unless a juror's
nondisclosure results in a partial jury.
The court's opinion begins by tracing
the legislative and judicial history of the
harmless error rules. These rules were
adopted to curb the abuses of appellate

review procedures because at one time
"courts of review tower[ ed] above the
trials... as impregnable citadels of
technicality" with trials representing
attempts to get reversible error on the
record. Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 759 (1946). The effect of the
harmless error rules is that courts, in
their judgment, can disregard errors in
the proceeding which do not interfere
with the fairness of the trial.
continued on page 24

RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME

F

or the first time in Maryland, a
trial court has held that expert
testimony on the victim's emo~
tional trauma is admissible in a rape
case to show the victim did not consent
to intercourse. State v. Allewalt, docket
No. 83~CR~2517 (Circuit Court for
Baltimore County November 4, 1983).
Relying on consent as his defense,
Allewalt was convicted of rape after a
psychiatrist described the symptoms
the complainant suffered, and testified
that they were attributable to the
emotional condition known as rape
trauma syndrome.
Rape trauma syndrome is a specific
type of stress disorder which arises
from the emotional impact of being
raped. The symptoms most commonly
associated with rape trauma syndrome
include fear of men in general, fear of
being alone, fear of being raped again,
disturbance in sleep habits, loss of
appetite, depression, and a sense of
shame.
Without the support of expert
testimony on rape trauma syndrome,
the defense of consent was often
difficult to disprove because of lack of
physical evidence. Many times the
decision in such a case would be based
solely on the testimony of the com~
plainant and defendant; therefore, the
credibility of each testimony was
critical in the determination of the
outcome. By allowing the expert to
testify, the complainant's testimony
that she did not consent to intercourse
can be corroborated by the testimony
of a psychiatrist. Rape trauma testimony,
therefore, could significantly strengthen
the prosecution's case.
Only a handful of states have directly
decided the issue of admissibility of rape
trauma syndrome. Minnesota, the only
state with more than one decision on
point, has held that the admission of
expert testimony on rape trauma
syndrome is reversible error. State v.
Fall, 1984/The Law Forum-ll

Sex-Based Mortality Tables
continued from page I4

IV.
One of the main purposes of Title VII
is to "make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination." Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418
( 1975). Moody illustrated the existence
of a strong presumption in favor of
retroactive relief for Title VII violations,
and Manhart stressed that the presumption was one that could seldom be
overcome. Upon examination of the
relief afforded Norris by the district
court below, which affected only those
benefit payments made after the date of
its judgment, the Supreme Court found
that such an award was inconsistent with
the presumption elicited in Moody and
recognized in Manhart.
Before remanding the issue to the
district court, the Supreme Court
suggested that the lower court give more
attention to the fact that, before
Manhart, the use of sex-based tables
might reasonably have been assumed to
be lawful. In addition, the Court noted
that the decision in Manhart should have
put the defendants on notice that a man
and a woman who make the same
contributions to a retirement plan must
be paid the same monthly benefits.
Therefore, the lower court should
examine whether the defendants, after
Manhart, could have applied sex-neutral
tables to the pre-Manhart contributions
made by the plaintiff, Norris, and a
similarly situated male employee without violating any contractual rights that
the latter might have had on the basis of
his pre-Manhart contributions. Norris,
103 S.Ct. at 3503-04. If the defendants
could have done this, they should have
in order to prevent further discrimination, and it would therefore be equitable
that defendants be required to supplement any benefits coming due after the
district court's judgment by whatever
sum necessary to "make Norris whole."

Id.

V.
Justice Powell, joined by three other
justices, dissented as to the defendants'
liability, basing his assertation on the
premises that sex-based mortality tables
reflect objective actuarial standards and
employee classification on the basis of
sex in reference to life expectancy is a
"nonstigmatizing factor that demonstrably differentiates females from males
and that is not measurable on an
individual basis .... " Norris, 103 S.Ct. at
3509.
24-The Law Forum/Fall, I984

The dissent further warned that the
potential effect of the majority's holding
would be to: 1) deny employees the
opportunity to purchase life annuities at
lower costs because (a) the cost to
employers of offering unisex annuities is
prohibitive, or (b) insurance carriers
would not choose to write such
annuities; 2) inflict the heavy cost
burden of equalizing benefits sustained
by those insurance companies and
employers choosing to offer such on
current employees; and 3) have a
disruptive impact on the operation of an
employer's pension plan as an unforeseen contingency jeopardizing the insurer's solvency and the insured's
benefits. Id.
The potential effect of the majority's
holding on insurance companies and
employers has yet to be fully observed.
Nonetheless, it is now clearly established
that an employer or insurer can no
longer fashion his personal policies on
the basis of assumptions about the
differences between men and women
previously believed to be valid. W

by Robert J. Farley
Lack of Jury Impartiality
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In 1919, the Judicial Code, § 269 (28
U.S.c. § 391) espoused the principle
that on any appeal, a court was to
examine the trial record "without regard
to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial
rights of the parties." The essence of this
provision was incorportaed in Rule 61
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This harmless error provision instructs
the district courts that throughout a trial
proceeding judges "must disregard any
error which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties."
(emphasis added). Support for this
principle can be found in De Santa v.
Nehi Corp., 171 F.2d 696 (2d. Cir.
1948), where the court held that it is
considered best practice for appellate
courts to act in accordance with the
mandate of Rule 61. The principle of
Rule 61 was ultimately codified by
Congress to be specifically applied to
appellate courts in 28 U.S.c. §2111
(1949).
In McDonough Power, the Supreme
Court noted that a fair trial requires an
impartial trier of fact- U[ a] jury capable
and willing to decide the case solely on
the evidence before it," Smith v. Phillips,
455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) and that an

important safeguard of jury impartiality
is the voir dire examination. The court
held that in order to uphold the due
process requirement of impartiality,
prospective jurors must answer honestly
questions posed to them.
With these principles in mind, the
Supreme Court reviewed the varied
responses given by prospective jurors in
McDonough when the history of severe
injuries question was posed. The range
of responses indicated that each juror
interpreted the question differently;
some jurors' responses revealed injuries
resulting from minor incidents while
other jurors' responses failed to disclose
injuries resulting from serious accidents.
The court acknowledged that even
though the jurors were mistaken by
failing to disclose various injuries
sustained by their family members, their
responses were honest in light of their
interpretation of the voir dire question.
The Supreme Court held that the
policy of judicial management, evidenced
by the harmless error rules of disregarding errors that do not interfere with the
fairness of a trial, must be upheld
because the importance of trial finality
outweighs evidence of trial imperfection.
To effect the policy behind the harmless
error rules, the court adopted the
following two-part test to evaluate the
propriety of granting a motion for a new
trial based on lack of information
received from a juror on voir dire
examinations: (1) "a party must first
demonstrate that a juror failed to answer
honestly a material question on voir
dire" and (2) "that a correct response
would have provided a valid basis for a
challenge for cause." _U.S. _ , _ .
There are two concurring opinions in
McDonough Power. Justice O'Connor
concurred with the majority, holding
that "honesty of a juror's response is the
best initial indicator of whether the
juror in fact was impartia1." _ U.S.
- , _ . However, Justice O'Connor's
concurrence is written with the view that
the ultimate determinations regarding
the existence of juror bias and the need
for a new trial remain within the trial
court's discretion.
In the second concurrence, Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
agreed with the majority's result but
asserted a different test to evaluate the
granting of a motion for a new trial based
on lack of information by a juror on voir
dire examination. Justice Brennan's test
focuses on a juror's bias, not his
honesty, and requires a party seeking a
new trial to demonstrate that: (1) "the

juror incorrectly responded to a material
question on voir dire" and (2) "the
juror was biased against the moving
litigant." _ U.S. - - > _ _ In deter~
mining whether the juror was biased
against the moving litigant, Justice
Brennan wrote that the honesty or
dishonesty of the response and whether
the incorrect response was made inten~
tionally or inadvertently are two factors
that must be considered.
The Supreme Court's decision in
McDonough Power places more impor~
tance on the value of trial finality than
on the value of trial perfection through
the adoption of its two~part test used in
evaluating the granting of a motion for a
new trial because of a juror's failure to
disclose information on voir dire
examination. By leaving room for
harmless error at the trial level, the
Court further eliminates the possibilities
of battles of technicality as potential
grounds for a new trial, promotes and
upholds the policy of judicial efficiency,
and ensures substantially just and
equitable results in trial proceedings by
demanding an impartial jury.

become a ward of the state if the
agreement did not satisfy the husband's
obligations. The second reason was that
the agreement would be abused in states
where divorce was based on marital fault
because the husband could force his wife
to bring an action by abusing her and
thus limiting the amount he would have
to pay. Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tex. App.
594,385 S.W.2d 288 (1964). Maryland
has both fault and no fault divorce but
followed this reasoning because it was
unanimously accepted by other states.
In evaluating these rationales the Frey
court looked to other jurisdictions and
current Maryland law.
In other jurisdictions, the prohibition
against antenuptial agreements has been
abandoned. These jurisdictions assert
that there is little evidence to support
the view that antenuptial agreements
induce divorce. Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill.
App.2d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972).

m
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Antenuptial Agreements
continued from page 13

consonant with the needs of contem~
porary society, a court ... has ... the duty
to re~examine its precedents rather than
to apply by rote an antiquated formula."
Id. at 258~59, 462 A.2d at 514 (quoting
Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 351
N.E.2d 526, 532 (1976)). The court
proceeded to evaluate precedent in light
of Maryland's present public policy.
The court noted that antenuptial
agreements in contemplation of death
were treated differently from antenuptial
agreements in contemplation of divorce;
the former is permitted when validly
executed. For an agreement which
contemplates death to be valid several
factors must be considered; these will be
discussed later. See Hartz v. Hartz, 248
Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 (1967). How~
ever, in Cohn v. Cohn, 209 Md. 470, 121
A.2d 704 (1956), the court held that
antenuptial agreements in contempla~
tion of separation or divorce were void
as against public policy. This holding
was based on two reasons. The first
was that the state's interest in pre~
serving the marriage would be defeated
by an antenuptial agreement which
would induce divorce. Id. at 475~76,
121 A.2d 706~07. The wife might

The courts also recognize that the roles
of husband and wife have changed over
the years. The wife is now less likely to
become a ward of the state since women
have become more prevalent in the work
place and have the necessary skills to
carryon after a divorce. Another reason
for abandoning the prohibition is that
the state has no interest in preserving a
marriage which has deteriorated to a
point beyond hope. In addition, a
majority of the states allow no~fault
divorces including Maryland under Md.
Ann. Code art. 16, § 8824~25 (1981).
Furthermore, the Maryland General
Assembly has indicated that Maryland's
present public policy recognizes these
agreements, and therefore they cannot
be against public policy. The General
Assembly enacted the Marital Property
Act, 11978 Md. Laws 794, which
pertains to property distribution upon
divorce. Maryland Code (1974, 1980
Repl. Vol.) Cts. &Jud. Proc. Article, 3~
6A~01(c), (e) allows the parties to

determine what will be considered
marital property. Since the General
Assembly permits antenuptial agreements
that dispose of property upon divorce
and since the state law's function is to
express public policy, the Frey court
decided that Cohn v. Cohn, 209 Md.
470, 121 A.2d 704 (1956), must be
overruled.
However, antenuptial agreements in
contemplation of divorce are not
automatically valid. Hartz v. Hartz, 248
Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 (1967), sets out
the tests and factors to be used in
determining whether the agreement is
valid. Id. at 56~59, 234 A.2d 870~ 73. It
must be fair and equitable. There also
must be full and truthful disclosure of all
assets. Id. at 56, 234 A.2d 871. The
parties must enter into the agreement
voluntarily and fully realize its meaning
and effect. Id. at 56~57, 234 A.2d 870~
71. Independent legal advice is also
important. Id. at 60, 234 A.2d 873. In
determining if there is overreaching, the
court should look at the following
factors: ages of the parties, income,
obligations and ties, needs of the
relinquishing party, and circumstances
leading to the execution of the agreement.
Id. at 58~59, 872. The agreement will be
valid only if these tests have been met.
Justice Smith concurred in part and
dissented in part. He dissented from the
holding that the agreement was not
valid. Justice Smith believes that public
policy allows premarital agreements but
only to the extent that they do not waive
alimony. In his opinion, Maryland Code
(1974, 1980 Repl. Vol.), Cts. & Jud.
Proc. Article, 3~6A~01(c), (e) does not
concern alimony, but only such property
acquired during the marriage~family use
personal property. Justice Smith stated
that the state's interest is to make sure
the marriage tie is not "lightly" broken;
and now that either spouse may be
required to pay alimony, the public
policy is needed more than ever.
The court's decision does not apply to
all antenuptial agreements but it is
limited to those agreements which
concern property and financial obliga~
tions. Agreements which attempt to
limit the duty of a spouse to support the
other spouse or which provide that the
spouse does not have to support the
children may be against public policy. ~
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